Anxiety Defences: Their Origin, Functioning and Evolution: Part 1

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A critical response to the general introduction and background exposition of Kleinian concepts as presented in Chapters 1 - 5 of ‘Developments in Psycho-Analysis’

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For Sigmund Freud, psychological life begins with the Oedipus Complex at the onset of which the person carries certain instinctual characteristics, which influence the developmental process. The genius of Melanie Klein pressed this frontier back so that for her life begins at birth, or more accurately, immediately after birth, with the infant at the breast. At this point there are certain innate characteristics which generate the object relations and which constitute and shape the anxiety defences so central to human psychological development. Stanislav Grof, following Otto Rank, pushes the frontier further back pre-birth into the womb, but sees the foetus bringing to the oceanic state of intra-uterine existence certain elements of transpersonal awareness, pre- and re-incarnational traces, and cosmic awareness which appear to be reifications of phantasy and projection similar to those found in Hindu thought, rather than attempts to push back the frontiers of scientific psychoanalysis.

I postulate that life begins at conception, at which point the fertilised ovum carries certain genetically determined characteristics. It is the slowly developing awareness of the foetus in womb that provides the experiential ground out of which come religious constructs, shadowy intuitions of re-incarnational experience and the archetypes of the racial unconscious described by Jung. The disturbance of the Oceanic phase by the onset and process of birth, constitutes the matrix of those primitive anxiety defences described by Melanie Klein as paranoid-schizoid and which emerge as innate in the new-born babe suckling at the breast. The development of the babe in arms through the early stages of establishing object relations employs these innate anxiety defences and brings the infant with certain 'instinctual' drives to the onset of the Oedipal phase, the foundation of the classical Freudian analytic position.

For those areas of psychoanalysis which take the assumptive starting point for human development as after birth, the intra-uterine and parturitional history is split off and denied. The effect is to generate a split infant, be this in terms of conflicted instinct or innate anxiety defence, as the origin of human development. Within such a framework there can be no access to, nor modification of, the primitive anxiety-defences which are taken as given, normative and unalterable. In so far as traumatic experience within the developmental process intensifies and fixates these primitive defences into psychotic disorder, it is the triggering rather than originating trauma which receives analytic attention, and the core of the psychosis is therefore inaccessible, either in terms of analysis or therapy. Containment rather than treatment of psychotic disorders, matched by collusion with normative anxiety defence patterns and a clear history of repression of any material which might lead to their modification, characterise the history and practice of psychoanalysis. This is typified by D.W. Winnicott's stance of attributing nil significance to the normative, a stance which, while
consistent with a therapeutic programme, is inconsistent with a concern for holistic human development. An analytic stance, which sees as its goal the return (to within tolerable limits of the norm) of deviant patterns of behaviour, will resist the analysis and modification of normal anxiety defence systems. That which seeks to enable maturational development; in other words, shifts towards integration of normal behaviour, must focus its attention on precisely that central area which is avoided by the therapeutic analyst.

This study of the work of Melanie Klein seeks to highlight the positive contribution to the developmental field which her insights into the functioning of paranoid-schizoid defences against anxiety bring to bear. It also focuses attention on the repressive and collusional positions which underlay Melanie Klein's therapeutic stance.

As with other position papers, no attempt has been made to impose an organisational framework on the material other than that arising from the progression of text within the book. It is perhaps worth noting at this stage that Otto Rank's fundamental work on Birth Trauma while written in 1924 in German was not translated into English until 1952, the year of publication of this book. There is no index nor bibliographical reference to Rank's writing, and Melanie Klein would appear to be working in ignorance of its significance, following the split between Freud and Rank in 1926. This silence speaks loudly and eloquently of the splitting off of all intra-uterine and parturitional material as non-significant for Melanie Klein, or in other words, as carrying such high levels of anxiety as to be subject to those repressive and collusional mechanisms which remove the most threatening and significant material from conscious examination.

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In his preface to the book, the series editor, Ernest Jones, writes,

Preface page v

'Bitter experience has taught us that resistance against the unconscious can be so subtle that it may distort the analytic findings and reinterpret them in support of some personal defence. How can this disturbing state of affairs be distinguished from a true development, a deepening of our knowledge of the unconscious? The sole criterion that can legitimately be employed is that valid for all science, a consensus of conclusions reached by adequately qualified workers using the same method in similar conditions.'

Right at the beginning then, Ernest Jones notes the subtle and manipulative unconscious resistance to developments in psychoanalysis. His recipe for dealing with the problem is, however, inadequate in those areas where there is common unconscious collusion with common anxiety defences among the 'qualified workers' operating in the field. In other words, the nearer the field of psychoanalysis presses to the origin of normative anxiety defences, the less able it becomes to make headway against the unconscious repressive distortion, seduction and collusion. This process appears again and again, within the rest of the volume.
This chapter earths Melanie Klein's thinking in the original and creative work of Sigmund Freud, seeking to establish basic coherence and continuity between the two analysts. Melanie Klein is seen as building on foundations laid by the master, so the author writes,

'Freud discovered the unconscious mind of man; she has explored its deepest recesses.'

So Melanie Klein's most creative contributions are seen to be made at points where she has pushed back the frontiers of Freudian analysis, clarified its paradoxes and filled out its lacunae. It would appear, however, that the dependency upon the archetypal figure of psychoanalysis carried with it a certain amount of collusion with the splits and reified projections and phantasies of Freud himself which emerge so clearly in his reaction to Carl Jung and Otto Rank.

So Joan Riviere notes,

'It may be that (Freud)..... did not fully recognise that an interaction of the external and internal relations of the individual is a duality as essential and as fundamental in mental functioning as the other great duality which he discovered.

'As it has turned out, however, this other duality, Freud's theory of the two basic forces - which for the present we have to call the Life and Death Instincts - eventually made it possible for Melanie Klein to understand the general law underlying her findings in her studies of the earliest forms of mental life in infants and small children. The enormity, to our adult minds, of the destructiveness and cruelty which any detached enquirer who follows the paths of her investigations will find in babies ceases to be such an insoluble mystery when, as she shows, Freud's hypothesis of a destroying force in our minds, always in interaction with the life-preserving force, is allowed its due significance. This concept of a destructive force within every individual, tending towards the annihilation of life, is naturally one which arouses extreme emotional resistance; and this, together with the inherent obscurity of its operation, has led to a marked neglect of it by many of Freud's followers, as compared with any other aspect of his work.

With the origin of paranoid-schizoid defences against anxiety cut off from examination by her assumptive starting point, Melanie Klein had recourse to definitions and assumptions about that which was innate to provide an aetiology for the observed phenomena. Freud's hypothesis of the conflicting life and death instincts as given within the nature of man provided just such a construct. I would now posit that this construct itself is a reification of anxiety defence which protected the origin of paranoid-schizoid defences from examination. It therefore represents part of the collusional defence system which preserves the unconscious from fundamental disturbance. It would seem that the neglect of Freud's work on life and
death instincts provides further evidence of this collusional pattern within subsequent analytic study.

Page 3

'Melanie Klein's main discoveries relate to the very early phases of mental life, where she finds in operation mental mechanisms (splitting, projection, etc.) closely similar to those of the psychotic disorders, another aspect of her work which arouses strong emotional resistance. We cannot overlook the fact, however, that when that other unwelcome proposition, the death instinct, previously arrived at by Freud by a different clinical route, is applied to the unwelcome findings revealed by the independent path of her child-analyses, the latter then become capable of explication. It is impossible to ignore the corroboration which the work of each receives from the other on this point. It may be said, moreover, that it is clearly no accident that each of these results in turn have met with disfavour, since they prove to be so closely related. Nevertheless, it was only in the latter years of her own investigations that Melanie Klein could show in detail the inherent connection underlying Freud's duality of instincts and the earliest emotional development of babies, namely, in the relation of persecutory anxiety and the development of guilt-feeling with depressive anxiety to the workings of the death instinct.'

The 'strong emotional resistance' can perhaps be best understood if we see that the mental mechanisms operating in the very early phases of mental life, namely the paranoid-schizoid defences against anxiety which are so closely related to the psychotic disorders, are present in depth in normal adulthood. They surface as normal behaviour under high stress, whether in reaction to infantile trauma or later episodes, or during phases of adult experience in which the person is exposed to very high stress levels with inadequate resources. These primitive regressive anxiety defences predominate also in those social systems exposed to similar levels of stress. They are utilised as defences in situations where anxiety is intense, and associated with a persecutory environment or the handling of major boundaries. The emotional resistance to the description of such processes in early life arises, therefore, from the repressive and defensive mechanisms which sustain the basic or fundamental adult anxiety defence systems in place. If the conflict is interpreted simply as the outrage felt that every infant is psychotic, then we are simply dealing with unwelcome information. The defences appear to be stronger than that, indicating the presence of unconscious collusional systems triggered by the material in normal adult reaction.

Freud's death instinct would inevitably be subject to the same kind of resistance since it originates in the same matrix. I take it that the source of splitting and the source of the death instinct will be one and the same and will lie at the origin of primitive defences against anxiety, which are not simply infantile, but foundational for societal defences.

It was unfortunate, however, that Melanie Klein treated the death instinct as an explication of the operation of primitive mental mechanisms, since Freud's use of the phrase 'death instinct' is really a descriptive rather than a causally diagnostic position. Melanie Klein appears to have fallen into the well known trap of using an alternative description of a phenomenon as causally definitive. If, however, the death instinct is seen as originating in the introjection of the persecutory environment experienced during the onset and process of birth, then we begin
to see both Freud's and Melanie Klein's parallel constructs as twin descriptions of similar phenomena which stem from a common causal origin.

In a discipline where descriptions are taken as causal, there is no access to parameters of change. Only as access is gained to the causal parameters can modification of the primitive defences against anxiety become a possibility. The theoretical task then is not the relation of persecutory anxiety, guilt feeling and depressive anxieties, to the workings of the death instinct, but the relationship of paranoid-schizoid defences against anxiety and the death instinct to the originating traumatic interaction between the self and the environment.

Freud's own position is made fairly clear by Joan Riviere in the words:

Page 7

'The most important instance of Freud's own indecisive attitude about his theories is that of his postulation of the Life and death instincts. In propounding the theory and in direct discussion of it he was careful not to make it a first principle of psycho-analysis. Nevertheless, in his later work he expresses himself plainly, repeatedly referring quite simply to this instinctual duality as the foundation of intra-psychic conflict.'

The ambivalence and indecisiveness evidenced in Sigmund Freud's treatment of the area is mirrored by the splitting and ambivalence about the material in subsequent history of the Freudian psychoanalytic school. Splits, repression and defensive justification have emerged around the treatment of the death instinct, and in particular around any attempts to penetrate behind the phenomena to their causal matrix.

The dualistic foundation of intra-psychic conflict to which Freud pointed surfaces in many fields from Hegelian philosophy to Bruce Reed's oscillation theory of religion. Adequate understanding of the origin of the dualism therefore has major implications over vast fields of human thought and behaviour.

Further indications of the ambivalence with which the death instinct has subsequently been treated appear in the words,

Page 8

'The theory of the death instinct ..... is not merely rejected by many analysts but often treated as if it were no part of his theory and could be detached from his work. They may feel justified in so doing by his express sanction that psycho-analysis is not to stand or fall by this hypothesis, though he can hardly have intended the theory to fall by the wayside and be passed by in oblivion. His own interest in it is fully manifest in his later work, where he relates psychical conflicts and pathological disturbances to this hypothesis of instinctual conflict.'

The attempt by later generations to split Sigmund Freud's construct follows through Freud's own splitting off from examination of the origin of the death instinct which surfaced in his dispute with Otto Rank. So far as Freud was concerned, Otto Rank's hypothesis fell by the
wayside and was passed by in oblivion. It is hardly surprising that the construct within Freud’s own work which contained the same phenomena should receive the same treatment.

It is, of course, significant that Freud's attribution of psychical conflict and pathological disturbance to the hypothesis of instinctual conflict should be in parallel with Melanie Klein's attribution of psychotic disorder to the predominance of primitive defences against anxiety associated with the very earliest phases of mental development.

The problem of the death instinct and the problem of the origin of anxiety meet with the same hostile reception, thus,

'It can be no accident that the problem of anxiety in all its bearings constitutes another fundamental divergence between the work of Melanie Klein and that of her critics. For her it has been throughout the touchstone, the guiding thread which has led her through the maze, and has in the end brought Freud's postulate of a death instinct into logical and intelligible relation with all the other elements of his work.'

Melanie Klein's pilgrimage in search of the origin of anxiety, and therefore of the primitive defences against anxiety which the initiating anxiety generated, has its parallel in Freud's ambivalent search into the origin and operation of the death instinct. Both processes are subject not only to irrational repression among others, but lead the initiating investigator into dynamic confrontation with the collusional systems which sustain the anxiety defences and prevent their examination and modification, a collusional position with which the unanalysed repressed areas of unconscious in both Klein and Freud resonate.

Not that Freud himself was unconcerned about anxiety and its origins,

'To Freud himself, anxiety was of very great significance; it constantly preoccupied him from beginning to end of his work. It is true that his approach to it was to some extent from the physiological angle, as a condition of tension which must be investigated and understood, and that he did not concern himself with the psychological content of the fear (phantasies) to the extent that Melanie Klein has done. Anxiety, with the defences against it, has from the beginning been Melanie Klein's approach to psycho-analytic problems. It is from this angle that she discovered the existence and importance of the aggressive elements in children's emotional life, which led her to her present formulations about persecutory and depressive anxieties and the defences used by the early ego against them. Ultimately it enabled her to bring much of the known phenomena of mental disorders into line with the basic principles of analysis. One interesting point to be mentioned in this connection is the direct link between anxiety and the theory of the life and death instincts.

'Melanie Klein's correlation of this theory with the accepted facts of early development, and with her other findings in relation to this period and all their
bearing on later life, enabled numerous previously unrelated phenomena to be seen as parts of a coherent whole.'

One of the marks of the approach to causal solution of a problem is that previously disjointed phenomena are integrated by the emergent construct. Thus while Newton's Laws were adequate within a certain field, mismatched phenomena began to be detected at its boundary. It was the strength of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity and later his General Theory of Relativity that it included these previously mismatched and disparate phenomena within one coherent field construct. The direction of field integration indicates the future agenda and direction of problem solving; another indication that encourages one to probe that which is taken as innate in Melanie Klein's work as offering most hope of producing an integrated field construct that deals with the whole range of human behaviour.

Joan Riviere underlines Melanie Klein's achievement in this area,

Page 11

'She has in fact produced something new in psycho-analysis namely, an integrated theory which, though still in outline, nevertheless takes account of all psychical manifestations, normal and abnormal, from birth to death, and leaves no unbridgeable gulfs and no phenomena outstanding without intelligible relation to the rest. Remembering as we do how little correlation Freud was perforce able to effect between the various fields and subjects of his enquiries and how many problems he broached without pursuing the two most important being probably the psychotic elements in human psychology and mental development in the earliest period we are not unaware of the scope of Melanie Klein's achievement, based as it is on his work.'

One would expect the Freudian construct to be shot through with paradox and inconsistency, splits, projection and introjection, denial and idealisation, since these were the mechanisms underlying the primitive defences against anxiety to which he was not able to gain access. The genius of Melanie Klein was that she penetrated to the function and effects of these phenomena and was therefore able to control their disruption of the construct within which she worked. The fundamental limitation of her work, however, is clearly underlined within this paragraph, namely that the field within which she was able to create an integrated theory originated at birth, or to be precise, from immediately after birth. The life trace was split at this point and the world of conception to after-birth holds that which is still unconscious within the Kleinian construct. The attribution of innate or instinctive quality to this unconscious content colludes with the fundamental split and elides the necessity for further probing into the human unconscious. However, in so far as phenomena emerge in after-birth generated by this level of the unconscious, just so far does Melanie Klein's theoretical construct fail to provide an integrated field. These mismatched phenomena appear when normal anxiety defences are challenged, or when persons and human groups are subject to excessive stress and under-resource, in other words, experience an environmental impingement which reactivates birth or intra-uterine experience. As soon as this area is allowed open for examination a host of related phenomena begin to fall into place including reactions to change, processes of learning, emergence of knowledge and information field integration, levels of management, let alone the vast field of religious phenomena, including the examination of theological construct and ritual behaviour as an example of social psychosis stemming from the intra-uterine and parturitional experiences common to man.
In an attempt to defuse the unconscious resistance of readers to the analytic concepts and case study material presented in the book, Joan Riviere explores some of the dynamics behind such reaction. She notes first,

Page 22

'....the old denial of their own reality to psychical processes (emotional experiences) which Freud had to combat.'

Secondly she notes,

Page 22

'Linked with this is the intense psychological resistance against the present unconscious reality becoming conscious.'

Further she notes the association of adult psychosis with infantile phantasy and anxiety defence,

Page 22

'The quality of delusion and "madness" which to our conscious minds appears so strongly to characterise these phantasies derives from the fact that these earliest emotional experiences can contain the seeds which later in some cases develop into psychotic disorders. Consequently they stir up in the reader anxieties which all of us experienced in early infancy, dangers which have been averted and overcome with pain and effort in the course of our development. The methods and defences we used in this struggle became an integral and most valued part of our personality, which seems to be menaced again when we are again confronted with these very primitive impulses and dangers.'

Or in similar vein she writes,

Page 22

'Plain statements of things which have probably never been conscious in an individual until his analytic experience, and are never verbalized at all by most people at any age, are not easily tolerated when heard or set down in print .... they often rouse mingled horror and excitement in readers...'

If those unfamiliar with psychoanalytic theory and practice evidence this kind of repressive anxiety on the boundaries of the psychoanalytic profession, it is hardly surprising that the psychoanalytic profession acts with the same repressive anxiety at its own research frontier. In fact the repression is doubly intensive since analysts have to tolerate not only their own anxieties but also societal anxiety associated with the raising to consciousness of previously repressed unconscious material.

Turning to the processes of introjection and projection and the part they play in mental functioning throughout life Joan Riviere notes,
It would seem that we might have guessed at the importance of these processes for primitive mental levels from the body of anthropological knowledge existing before the days of psycho-analysis about the mentality of 'uncivilised' peoples, and later of course much enlarged by the work of Roheim and others. The beliefs, activities and rituals, etc., of primitive tribes appear to be very largely representations both of taking in to the body or expelling from it good and bad objects respectively, and of fears of the converse and defensive measures against that. What to the savage is comparatively conscious, however, and a normal part of life, has become increasingly taboo and repressed to Western civilized man, though it has played a large part in the Christian religion, e.g. in the Communion rite. The psychological need in man to obtain satisfaction and relief by some concrete bodily form of 'taking in goodness' and eliminating bad and dangerous agents from himself is now widely distrusted in educated circles and regarded as deriving from 'superstition'. Paradoxically enough, it still finds an outlet in hypochondriacal terms, e.g. in the prevailing need to imbibe curative goodness by medical attention or drugs, by sunbathing and so on, as well as to eliminate evil by athletics, purgatives, etc.

It would seem hardly surprising that the connections between the anthropological analysis of primitive society and the operation of introjection/projection mechanisms within Western civilisation should have been hard to make since the repression and unconscious defences associated with these mechanisms would prevent the creative juxtaposition from taking place. While it is allowable to examine primitive religion, for instance, as a reification of projected objects, a symbol construct supported by ritual process which keeps in place the primitive defences against anxiety, no such examination of the place of religion in Western society can be tolerated while that construct itself carries the anxieties of that society. With increasingly competent analysis of the less primitive anxiety defences and the decay in the effectiveness of the religious system as an anxiety defence validator, it is hardly surprising that we face a massive emergence of the more primitive anxiety defences in the increasingly frequent occurrence of psychotic behaviour both at individual and societal levels. Together with this there is increasingly violent repression of any further advances in psychoanalysis which are perceived to threaten even greater erosion of the now tenuous defences against anxiety which enable society to hold together. The taboos operating at the research frontier of psychoanalysis also operate on the frontier between psychoanalysis and religion and serve the same end.

Although Melanie Klein's work has been carried out almost completely within a therapeutic context, there are pointers towards the importance of some of its implications in the field of human development. For instance Joan Riviere notes,

'An interesting point is the suggestion that the strength or otherwise of the early splitting mechanisms influences the development of repression. It appears that the high degree of inaccessibility to the unconscious met with in schizoid types derives from the strength of the early splitting processes. In people who have developed more successfully and more nearly reached full maturity, the mind is comparatively "porous" and there is much more capacity for insight into the unconscious and ability
to maintain it when gained; it does not become repeatedly split off again in the same way.'

Application within the book of such insights is to the field of psychiatry rather than that of human development, but again the societal repressive mechanisms will apply here since development towards integration of the normal patterns of anxiety defence comes beyond the primary task of psychoanalysis (by primary task is understood that function performed by psychoanalysis on behalf of society which engenders the continued societal support of the discipline, so enabling it to continue to perform the primary task). If the primary task of psychoanalysis is the containment and returning to within tolerable limits behaviour which has passed beyond standard deviation of the norm of socially acceptable patterns, then insight, interpretation and intervention of psychoanalysts in behaviour which actually generates normal social patterns is taboo, albeit essential to facilitate development of normal persons. That which is described as 'full maturity' could also be described as normal psychosis or close to the mean of the distribution pattern of primitive defences against anxiety. Now if the high degree of inaccessibility to the unconscious met within schizoid types stems from the strength of early splitting processes it would seem apparent that shifts in normal levels of maturity occur in so far as normal levels of splitting are modified. Here lies the heartland of developmental psychology right at the centre of the no-go area of therapeutic psychoanalysis.

Applying some of Melanie Klein's insights to the techniques of psychoanalysis the writer points out,

Page 28

'...the necessity to uncover the persecutory aspects of the analyst in the patient's mind, and the serious dangers of allowing the corresponding idealized aspects to mask and obscure the acute anxieties and negative trends which are under the surface in the transference nevertheless effectively defeat genuine therapeutic progress.'

It is increasingly clear that traditional Christian religious worship intensifies, reifies and idealises the projected good primal object or primal environment while intensifying the oppression or denial of the negativities, so validating the societal defences against anxiety and sustaining social dependency within a regressed, primitive, paranoid- schizoid, dynamic mode.

Pressing on to the topic of manic defence Joan Riviere writes,

Page 28

'The essential feature of the manic defence in earliest development arises from its specific relation to depressive anxieties. It is not so much that a new process or mechanism comes into operation, but that the previous mechanisms of denial, idealization, splitting, and control of objects, external and internal, used in the preceding phase to counteract persecutory anxiety, are used by the stronger ego against depressive anxieties, i.e. phantasy- situations in which the loved object is felt to be suffering, injured and in danger; such feelings and phantasies are then by the manic method split off, denied and stifled.'
Again the quality of manic behaviour within religion is common and clear with the stress on joy, rejoicing, celebration, peace and the serious repression of negative emotional behaviour – depression, anger, grief, loss, rage, terror, anxiety, etc.

Presumably within Melanie Klein's construct, depressive anxieties arise because of the projection onto the loved object of the innate death instinct, just as persecutory anxiety arises by the introjection and application to the self of the same instinct, perceived as a persecutory environment. The use of the word 'instinct' as explicatory or satisfyingly causal is itself evidence of the splitting off of creativity at this point of investigation. Presumably Melanie Klein here reached the limits of tolerance of her own anxieties and the primitive defences against anxiety which she described so well emerge within her own writing. The word 'instinct' is defined within the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as 'innate impulse, natural or spontaneous tendency, an innate propensity in organised beings.... manifesting itself in acts which appear to be rational but are formed without conscious adaptation of means to ends'. To seek to explain innate behaviour as stemming from instinct (i.e. innate behaviour) is clearly tautological. Kleinian analysis reaches its point of bankruptcy but masks its frontier by circular argument.

Treating Melanie Klein's understanding of the origin of anxiety Joan Riviere states,

'Her propositions, although arising essentially out of Freud's work, were in no way adumbrated by him and in some respects directly controvert statements of his. In her view anxiety originates as a direct reaction by the life instinct to the strength of the death instinct in the organism, a supposition which Freud expressly rejected.... She says, "When the earliest anxiety-situations of young infants are revived and repeated in such analyses, the inherent power of an instinct ultimately directed against the self can be detected in such strength that its existence appears beyond doubt".'

So for Melanie Klein anxiety results as the reaction of the life instinct to the persecution set up by the death instinct, both of which appear innate. Those two words 'innate' and 'instinct' are used to foreclose further discussion and investigation. There is an important footnote in the text at this point which gives insight into Freud's understanding of this area and is worth quoting in full

'Freud held throughout to the view that there is no fear of death in the unconscious, in fact that the unconscious cannot contemplate any fate worse than castration. We must surmise that this view of his was influenced by his discovery of the unconscious primarily as a reservoir of libidinal impulses and by his experience of the beneficial effects of liberating these impulses from repression. From this angle it would appear that castration must represent the worst catastrophe, since it would put an end to all possibilities of libidinal, ultimately beneficial, creative and life-giving activities. Many analysts, however, have found it difficult to subscribe to Freud's view that in the unconscious castration represents the worst catastrophe. Ernest Jones' concept of
"aphanisis" - the total extinction of all and any sexual pleasures and capacities - made a decisive contribution towards widening the concept of apprehended danger (The Early Development of Female Sexuality' 1927). It could be said to stand midway between the fear of castration (Freud) and the fear of death (Klein); moreover, in Melanie Klein's view depressive anxiety is bound up with fears of death as well as with fears of the extinction of Eros - ultimately one and the same thing.'

It may well be that Freud's blockage in this area comes from an identification of the phallus with the whole person, which remained unanalysed in his own unconscious. This is an element of substitution of part for whole to which D.W. Winnicott drew attention and which could well form a bridge between Freud's understanding of the origin of anxiety and that of Melanie Klein. If that identification is in fact in place then castration represents death, for the part stands for the whole and represents the annihilation of the whole of being. Fear of castration is therefore the equivalent of fear of the destruction of the self generated by a persecutory environment. This is seen by Melanie Klein as an anxiety stemming from the conflict between the death instinct and the life instinct, but is more accurately perceived as a trace within infantile unconscious of the foetal experience of the onset of the birth process within which the previously good and supportive environment becomes persecutory and threatens to annihilate the self.

Melanie Klein makes important differentiations concerning type of anxiety, between persecutory and depressive, noting the relation of guilt to the latter, i.e. to love and concern for the injured object.

Page 31

'This discussion has a special bearing on psycho-analytic practice; it is an important matter in technique to distinguish clearly between the two varieties of anxiety from which the patient may be suffering at the moment. Melanie Klein mentions in this connection how the persecutory aspect is brought into the foreground, as a screen and defence against underlying depression and guilt.'

Just as Melanie Klein's work fails to provide a causal origin for the existence of the life and death instincts, so also her work on differentiation of forms of anxiety is descriptive but not causally analytic. I would posit that persecutory anxiety stems from the reversal of a previously experienced good environment in the oceanic intra-uterine phase, to the persecutory environment of the onset of the birth process. The perceived severity of attack by the environment at this stage of foetal existence determines the depth of splitting, the intensity of persecutory anxiety and the generation of retaliatory aggressive impulses. These in turn lead to depressive anxiety coupled with the introjection of the bad environment, the emergence of the bad self and the projection and introjection of the destructive impulses thrown up in reaction to the primal persecution. I would differentiate depressive anxiety into two forms, namely, a protection of environment or a protection of self, representing the repression of anarchic aggression or suicidal aggression; these two phases of aggressive reaction being responses to the projected and introjected persecutory environment. In my own experience of analysis the persecutory anxiety has to be faced and dealt with first and is then followed by a phase of depressive anxiety which can only be dealt with when the fundamental persecutory anxieties have been laid.
Moving on from the origin of anxiety to deal with the splitting mechanisms characteristic of primitive mental levels, Joan Riviere writes,

'The splitting mechanisms are seen mainly as a means by which the earlier types of anxiety are kept at bay. Their prototype may be said to be the splitting of the breast into two, one "good" and one "bad", i.e. splitting of the object, and the splitting of the ego's affects towards the object, e.g. into love and hate. From this original split the two primitive aspects of the object, the idealized and the persecutory, and the two corresponding attitudes toward them develop. Splitting occurs also between internal and external reality, and in relation to emotions, in that some or all may be split off and denied. The anxieties which arise in early infancy and are characteristic of the psychoses in adults drive the ego to develop these defence mechanisms; the fixation-points of greater psychotic disorders are formed in this very early period, and such anxieties and defences are symptomatic of later schizophrenia and paranoia.'

Here, perhaps, more than anywhere else, the disorganisation of Melanie Klein's construct becomes apparent. The origin of splitting is seen in relation to the breast, thus the splitting of the breast into good and bad is spoken of as the 'prototype', as the original split. Presumably, the splitting itself is a result of anxiety generated by the conflict experienced by the life instinct, under persecution by the death instinct, and projected onto the primal object, the breast. Thus the archetypal splitting is actually between the life instinct and the death instinct and is not generated by the prototype split in the experience of the breast. In this case, splitting of the breast is seen as symptomatic of the more fundamental level of splitting and not causal.

Melanie Klein seems to hint at this in the comments about splitting occurring between internal and external reality, in other words between self and environment. It is not, however, clear, whether she sees the environmental/self splitting as prior to, or resulting from, the 'prototype' splitting of the breast. Again, to say that the two primitive aspects of the object, the idealised and the persecutory develop from the original split is contradictory, since the original split was between good and bad, i.e. idealised and persecutory. I fail to see how these aspects can develop from that which included them in the origin. It would appear that Melanie Klein is herself affected by a confusional state as she approaches the origin of this material, a state generated by that repressed anxiety and the innate defences against it, which are already present in the infantile unconscious immediately post parturition.

Commenting that the anxieties which arise in early infancy and are characteristic of the psychosis in adults, drive the ego to develop these defence mechanisms, Melanie Klein indicates that anxiety is prior to the experience of good and bad breast, and gives rise to the splitting of the object as a defence against primary anxiety which is brought to the experience of object relations. It would appear that the defences of splitting, projection and introjection are already in place in relation to the environment of the new born, and are associated with the breast as the first tangible environmental object encountered. That hyper-stressing and traumatic fixation of the anxiety defences at this stage of development leads to later schizophrenia and paranoia is an important piece of therapeutic diagnosis. From the point of view of the developmental analyst the normal defences against anxiety of the most primitive kind have already been laid down prior to this period. Significant personal integration and
development demands the reintegration of primitive splitting, and the management of the levels of projection and introjection, idealisation and denial, associated with, and generated by, the acute anxiety generated by the experience of a persecutory environment at and before birth.

It is important to raise questions about the existence of the unconscious prior to the onset of this persecutory experience, seeing the split between conscious and unconscious as one of the main defences against anxiety. This itself delimits human development since it cuts off major elements of the cortex from conscious access as a defence against the overwhelmingly anxiety provoking traumatic trace, against the resurgence of which the unconscious defences are employed. I therefore put forward the hypothesis that the splitting of the psyche into conscious and unconscious is itself a normal psychosis or chronic form of schizophrenia which apparently characterises humanity, but is amenable to analytic abreaction and integrational therapy. If that hypothesis is substantiated, its implications for human development are massive. Resistance to the insight as itself a form of madness (i.e. deviation from the norm!) is to be expected on an even more intensive scale than any experienced in the early days by Freud himself or by Melanie Klein's pressing back of the frontiers of understanding of paranoid-schizoid mechanisms.

From the origins of anxiety and the functioning of the splitting mechanisms Joan Riviere turns her attention to Melanie Klein's treatment of projection and introjection.

Page 32

'The understanding of the projection-introjection mechanisms, especially in reference to the destructive impulses, threw light on the origin of the deepest anxieties of a paranoid-schizoid nature, and the insight into the defensive processes of the splitting mechanisms opens the way to an understanding of confusional, catatonic and other psychotic states. It is as if these forms of mental functioning which are a normal feature of early infancy were a part of our atavistic heritage which has to be repeated ontogenetically on the way to "higher" development, just as physical development is still in process of recapitulation in the initial period of life. The analogy would not be complete, however, since these stages of development are more than vestigial remains in the full grown psyche and may be reactivated to some degree even in the most mature adult.'

It might be more appropriate to say that the understanding of the projection/introjection mechanisms throws light on the deepest level of functioning of paranoid-schizoid defences against anxiety. There is little indication that this material in itself throws light on the origin of the fundamental anxieties themselves. It highlights rather reaction to anxiety. This confusion between cause and effect is itself evidence of a confusional state generated by the defensive process of splitting, operating at a collusional level to protect the basic anxiety defence mechanisms from analysis and modification. It may well be that Melanie Klein and her co-workers have underestimated the strength of the original anxiety which called into being the primitive anxiety defence system.

With the road to causal analysis blocked the writer seeks some kind of explication in displacement, a process which we now recognise as common among therapeutically-oriented analysts at this point. Here Joan Riviere avoids the term 'instinctive' or 'innate' or even the
Jungian phrase 'archetypal' but speaks of these basic paranoid-schizoid defences in terms of their being 'part of our atavistic heritage which has to be repeated ontogenetically on the way to "higher" development'. We are now familiar with the process of evolutionary recapitulation in the biophysical sense, as the human embryo develops from fertilised cell to fully formed infant, but the concept of 'ontogenesis' is metaphysical. To be sure the writer places the material here as an analogy, but it stands at the point which demands causal analysis of the genesis of anxiety and the emergence of the subsequent defences against that archetypal anxiety. The analogy performs the function of an aetiological myth. Just as Melanie Klein flips from Freud's use of instinct to her own use of the word innate which carries much the same implication of characteristics given at birth, so Joan Riviere moves from Jungian ancestral archetypes, or archetypes of the racial unconscious, to analogies of atavistic heritage, that which is carried through into the psychology of the present from the processes of our remote ancestors. It is at this point that the science of psychoanalysis shades into the myths of religion, offering reifications of projection in symbol construct form out of the residual unconscious of the analyst in order to avoid the pain of an unexplored frontier. The myth stands as a mirror, reflecting exploration back within the boundaries of the known.

When the symbols of myth and analogy are themselves subject to analysis we can get clues which point to the content and defences of the next layer of unconscious which is presenting itself for attention. Joan Riviere’s next paragraph provides revealing insights under such examination.

Page 33

'The discussion refers mainly to the concept of splitting occurring in the ego. The nature of the early ego is considered, which appears to be largely of an unintegrated character. Under the pressure of intense anxiety (ultimately deriving from the death instinct), the lack of cohesion in the ego would appear to result in a "falling to pieces" of the ego. This disintegration underlies the later disintegration in schizophrenia. The mechanics of the process are obviously similar to those of dispersal in wartime, to obviate the dangers of concentration and to minimize loss. The effects of these processes on the ego can be detrimental if they are carried too far, e.g., when aggressive impulses are too severely split off, denied and so on, there is an impoverishment of the ego, in that many desirable qualities such as potency, strength, knowledge, are closely associated with a measure of aggression.'

What is meant by early is not clear, but in context it would appear to mean soon after birth, or the earliest accessible form in which the ego can be observed in an independent organism. Here we are taken straight to the heart of one of the limitations which set boundaries to Melanie Klein's work, namely that the techniques she employed had to do with the observation of infants. It is impossible to observe the infant before birth. So for Melanie Klein the life of the subject begins at birth, the new-born infant is the innate, given, instinctive bundle, the ground of development, to probe into the origin of which is to transgress the boundaries of observation and recording. That is not to deny that some of her most significant work arose from the analysis of adults and older children in positions of regression to early infantile behaviour, and in that position employing primitive defence mechanisms. It is clear, however, that the boundary which delimited the level of analysable regression was identical to the boundary which delimited the possibilities of observation. Life begins at birth.
At this earliest point of observation the ego is perceived to 'be largely of an unintegrated character'. The assumption being that lack of cohesion, or integration, is the archetypal condition, and that maturation represents the slow process of integration, or at least partial integration, in order to cope with the realities of the environment and the necessities of existence. However, some embryonic form of reason for the unintegrated character is now put forward in the sentence, 'Under the pressure of intense anxiety (ultimately deriving from the death instinct) the lack of cohesion in the ego would appear to result in a falling to pieces of the ego'. Clearly if the ego 'falls to pieces' in the process leading to the innate position of 'unintegration', then a previously integrated ego state is implied. The originally integrated ego suffers persecution, in Klein's construct, from the anxiety generated by the death instinct impinging on the life instinct - anxiety which leads to the disintegration characteristic of 'the early ego'. The symbolism used is of the death instinct acting as a persecutory environment exerting constricting pressure around the boundary of an initially integrated but shatterable ego, creating intense anxiety, the result of which is ego disintegration. So far so good. Such questions should be asked as: Where does this intense anxiety come from? Why is it perceived as applying pressure on the boundary of the ego? Why are words like pressure, intense anxiety, falling, used at this point of the description? Unfortunately any analytic answer to these questions is blocked by an immediate appeal to the death instinct as explaining all. Once this tautology is invoked no further probing is required, and Pandora's Box can remain closed.

As if in displacement providing her own diagnosis, Joan continues, 'This disintegration underlies the later disintegration in schizophrenia'. The disintegration to which she refers at a conscious level is that evidenced in the early ego. It is, however, a process which not only emerges in later schizophrenia but which accurately describes the going to pieces of the argument in her preceding paragraphs. The primitive level of ego disintegration emerges to dominate and block the process of analysis at precisely that point at which it seeks to penetrate to the causal analysis of the origin of the anxiety defences. It is a mark of the normal paranoid-schizoid defences against anxiety that they are highly resistant to insight, deeply protected against analysis, and react by the generation of confusion, splitting, flight, displacement, projection, myth formation, or if these themselves begin to be contained, by anxiety and ultimately aggression, since any probing of this area is perceived to threaten nothing less than individual breakdown and social chaos. The recognition and analysis of patterns of psychosis as fundamental to normal behaviour meets with the same resistance to insight and modification as that generated in the attempted therapy in abnormal psychosis of paranoid-schizoid character.

The pattern of flight and displacement at this point in the text is similar to that in W.G. Lawrence's work at the identical stage in analysis. From examination of the origin of anxiety to its so-called explication by the death instinct to the occurrence of adult schizophrenia, to world war - the flight path is predictable, away from the birth trauma to perceived environmental persecution on a cosmic scale. It is a typical symbol trace emerging from the repressed unconscious, generated in that stage of parturition to which Stanislav Grof gives the term, 'basic perinatal matrix number two'. This could be described as the onset of persecution of the foetus by that which had previously been a supportive environment.

Moving on to the effects of the processes of ego disintegration Joan Riviere comments that they can be detrimental if carried too far. The judgement of what is too far is presumably set
in distinction from that which is normal, so that if the aggressive impulses are abnormally split off there is ego impoverishment in relation to normal ego function. What is not open or accessible to examination is the level of ego impoverishment below full potential which constitutes the normal level of ego disintegration. To be sure in the abnormally disintegrated, many desirable qualities such as potency, strength, and knowledge, all closely associated with the measure of aggression are detrimentally suppressed. However, in terms of developmental psychoanalysis, we face the question as to how far the norm itself is detrimentally impoverished by the sustaining, as fundamental to its behaviour, of primitive paranoid-schizoid defences against anxiety, mechanisms which are themselves held in place by social norm, by religious behaviour and by the sanctions, assumptions and unconscious collusions of therapeutic psychoanalysis.

As if without conscious or logical connection Joan Riviere moves in her next paragraph to say,

"Another important topic is the concept of "projective identification", which represents the phantasy of forcing the self in part or as a whole into the inside of the object in order to obtain possession and control of it, whether in love or in hate. This phantasy appears to connect closely with depersonalization phenomena and with claustrophobia.

The process of projective identification is dissociated from the previous material because of the disintegration of the analytic construct at this point. Since intra-uterine and parturitional experience is held in the unconscious, inaccessible, innate area of the construct, its effects appear as dissociated but juxtaposed phenomena. Field integration requires the inclusion of more primitive levels of the unconscious stemming from earlier levels of infant experience, if the causal connections between the phenomena are to be made conscious and explicit. I suggest that the process of projective identification (the phantasy of forcing the self in part or as a whole into the inside of the object) represents the process of regression from post-parturition to foetal intra-uterine position, eggression from which constitutes precisely the matrix of personalisation and the terminal experience of which provides the archetypal claustrophobic matrix.

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Joan Riviere enters the last three pages of her general introduction by moving on from the heartland of Melanie Klein's analytic construct to review some of its implications and the reactions to it, and to make some general comments about the rest of the material in the book. She notes, for instance,

"The exploration of these earliest anxieties and defences has led to a considerable advance in understanding certain psychic processes, which, when revived by regression, constitute psychotic disorder, and yet form part of normal early development. This aspect of Melanie Klein's work has provoked much opposition, on the ground that she regards all infants as psychotic. Such an inference actually has no
basis; on the contrary, her observations and conclusions have thrown new light for the first time on the processes by which normal development is achieved, as well as on the earliest origins of mental disorders.

The opposition to Melanie Klein's work in this area is better understood if we make the connection not simply with normal early development, nor the association with adult abnormal psychosis, but with the primitive psychotic defences which underlie normal adult behaviour. The aggressive response appears to fix on the insult to the normal infant with reference to adult abnormal psychosis as a displacement of the anxiety invoked by the attempt to raise to consciousness the unconscious psychotic elements in normal adult defences. Understanding of the anxieties raised by the material, and the unconscious collusions and repressive mechanisms used to defend the societal unconscious from exploration are essential if further headway is to be made in this field. Although working under heavy oppression, there are little pointers towards the developmental agenda embedded in the text as for instance,

Page 34

'The fuller understanding of the typical psychotic mechanisms has made it possible to recognize and interpret the minor or masked forms of them which are actually present in most if not all neurotics. As Melanie Klein points out, a mechanism such as splitting occurs in the form of transitory dissociations, or of forgetting, even in normal persons.'

Analytic and interventional engagement with normal mechanisms is however beyond the terms of reference of therapeutic psychoanalysis (whose primary task, like that of religion, has to do with the process of social control of the potentially chaotic elements). The fundamental continuity, however, has been made between the typically psychotic mechanisms, neurotic presentation and normal behaviour. While this connection is initially met with a storm of defensive reaction, it holds the seeds of developmental intervention within the norm and points the way to quite massive breakthrough in human development. The task is to overcome societal defences against such development which are mobilised from the heart of psychotic mechanisms themselves.

In terms of technique, the identification of splits, displacement, projection, etc., within the construct presented by any given person or institution indicates the eruption into the conscious of the unconscious defences and their underlying anxieties, so providing clues as to the direction to be taken by developmental analysis. These same indications provide warnings as to the area to be avoided by therapeutic analysis. In symbol form one may speak of therapeutic analysis moving tangentially to the surface of the sphere containing the causal matrix of the primitive defence mechanisms, developmental analysis moves perpendicularly to the surface of the same sphere.

Referring to Paula Heimann's chapter on the death instinct, Joan Riviere notes that it is a subject which arouses strong responses either of repulsion or attraction, in an area which Freud noted as one which could not be regarded as demonstrated and established. Joan Riviere sees Melanie Klein's direct observation of what is felt by the children to be an annihilating force in themselves, as containing direct evidence of the death instinct in operation. Paula Heimann attempts to show how various theories regarding the nature of
anxiety can be reconciled by reference to the concept of a death instinct. The importance in ordinary life of the need to hate, to find or imagine 'bad' persons in the environment is clarified by the necessity to deflect a measure of the death dealing force outwards and so on. However, this repetitive appeal to death instinct as a causal explanation of such phenomena is inadequate. We would now see the behaviour which gave rise to Freud's hypothesis of the death instinct, and to Melanie Klein's attribution of paranoid-schizoid defences against anxiety as innate, as arising from the foetal experience of the reversal of the supporting environment into the persecutory environment at and before the onset of parturition. Paranoid projection in adult life represents the projection onto the experienced environment of this archetypal persecutory environment buried deep in the unconscious.

The survey of the history of the development of psychoanalysis with which Joan Riviere concludes her general introduction is itself a stylised construct which splits off and denies historical developments which did not fit with her perceptions. She writes,

Page 35

'The development of psycho-analytic knowledge, a large proportion of which forms the matter of this book, like most studies of genetic development, proceeds always backwards in time, i.e. in an inverse direction to that of the life of the individual. The first attempts at scientific psychology were concerned only with the superficial, the conscious, the adult forms of mental activity. Even so, the study of hypnotism at the same time was in fact already pointing to the existence of less obvious mental processes. Then Freud's discoveries revealed at one stroke what lies under the adult and the conscious, namely, the forces of unconscious mental activity and their close relation to the psychology of the child. The unconscious mind, operating unknown to him in every adult, is, broadly speaking, still the mentality of the child. The more we progress in knowledge of it and its development, therefore, the farther back in the life of the individual we are led and the more remote and alien our findings become from the conscious, the adult and what are called the rational forms of mental life.

'Thus the progress in our knowledge brought about by Melanie Klein's investigations takes us farthest backward, in the life of the individual to a period not previously explored.... To say this is in no way to underestimate the completely novel and revolutionary work on this early period done by Freud himself, or by Abrahams, Jones or Ferenczi.'

Unfortunately history is not quite so simple. Only by omitting the early work of Otto Rank and by splitting off from some of the implications of Carl Jung's work can such a stylised progression be sustained. However, viewing development from within the Freudian analytic school, i.e. as an existential awareness of progression, the trace is understandable and accurate. The tragedy is that it appears to move towards a terminus rather than along an open road. It is blocked by birth. The assumption is that if we can press our understanding of the unconscious back to the origin of life of the individual then we can gain an integrated field construct within which all behaviour can be understood as falling within a coherent pattern. The cutting off of life at birth blocks the achievement of such a construct. The unconscious mind operating, unknown to him, in every adult Freudian or Kleinian analyst is broadly speaking still innate, i.e. the mentality of the newly born. Thus while the boundaries of the
conscious may be pushed back to this frontier the unconscious remains foetal, crushed, fragmented, dominant but unborn.

Far from a regression in time from adult to childhood, leading back to the origin of life in birth itself, we would now perceive the progress of psychoanalysis as a tentative moving forward in time of the deeply regressed foetal unconscious, mirrored back from the point of birth, its time axis reversed, but living within the world of afterbirth in a buried intra-uterine existence. This ambivalent progress towards birth represents a recovery of the developmental time progression which actually moved in continuity from conception through birth to the babe in arms and on to adulthood. The recovery of continuity in time will coincide with the recovery of integration of the mind, and the breaking down of the repressive splits and barriers between the conscious and the unconscious. Physically adult man as yet remains psychologically foetal, split off from the realisation of his full potential.

CHAPTER TWO, PAGES 37 - 66 'ON THE GENESIS OF PSYCHICAL CONFLICT IN EARLIEST INFANCY' BY JOAN RIVIERE

The paper was delivered to the Vienna Psycho-Analytical Society on 5th May 1936 and its purpose was to attempt to give a 'short, general formulation of the earliest psychical developmental processes in the child'. These were defined as 'the problems of oral sadistic impulses and their attendant anxieties, and the fundamental defence-mechanisms against them employed by the ego at this stage of development, with special reference to the defensive functions of projection and introjection'.

Analytic understanding of this matrix of conflict is seen as of fundamental importance for the whole field of psychoanalysis.

Page 37

'Fuller understanding and knowledge of the operation of these factors in the first year or two of life throw considerable light on the whole of early development, and thus clarify some of the obscurity hitherto existing in regard to ego-development and the genetic origin of the super-ego, together with the relation of these to infantile sexuality and libido-development. Any claim that psycho-analysis may make to understand the ego-structure of adults and older children necessarily implies the possibility of tracing its development genetically back to its earliest roots. An understanding of the anxieties and defences which arise in the ego as a result of the child's earliest object-relations must therefore be of special importance for the whole of psycho-analytic work'.

In recognising the significance of the areas of concern Joan Riviere nevertheless (albeit I suspect unconsciously) gives notice of the assumptions which set boundaries to the analytic process. The triple use of the word 'earliest' gives indication of this boundary, thus the origin of the psychical conflict is based on the oral sadistic ambivalence associated with the object relations between infant and breast. From this matrix stem the persecutory anxieties against which certain defences are erected. I would now wish to rewrite much of this material to say that an understanding of the origin of the anxieties and the defences used to contain them.
which are mapped out in the child's earliest object relations is of special importance for the whole of psychoanalytic work. The earliest object relations of infant and breast offer the first observable arena within which the fundamental anxiety defences can be seen to be operating. To treat such object relations as causally generative of the anxieties and hence of the defences themselves is indefensible as an assumptive base for psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Very soon, however, the assumptive framework is seen to be inadequate as awareness is gained of material which is prior to the object relations developed with respect to the breast,

Page 39

'The baby's mental life in its first weeks is narcissistic in character and ruled by the pleasure-pain principle, while the ego is primarily a body-ego. This is the stage of primary identification; the dawning psyche is unaware of an external world. Painful stimuli, whether from within or without, impinge on this pleasure-ego and rouse unpleasure, e.g. hunger or bodily pain caused by colic or wind internally, and loud noises or loss of support externally. Imprints of painful experience are formed in the psyche from the experience of birth onward alongside the more continuous experience of satisfaction, and possibly contentment, which is apprehended narcissistically.'

While Joan Riviere allows for imprints of painful experience from the experience of birth onward, it is not at all clear whether she allows the experience of birth itself as within the field or simply as the boundary of the field. Certainly the description of painful experience makes no reference whatever to birth experience. I think she has condensed into the stage from birth to the development of the first object relationship a developmental process which reaches way back into the intra-uterine position, which, I postulate, is itself the stage of primary identification in which the dawning psyche is unaware of an external world. The initial process of differentiation between in and out, between self and environment occurs in the later stages of intra-uterine development, followed by the archetypal experience of loss and environmental impingement which initiates anxiety, dread, splitting and attendant anxiety defences. Far from describing the genesis of psychical conflict, therefore, I see Joan Riviere's paper as describing some of the early manifestations of psychical conflict, whose genesis lies beyond the boundary of the field of admissible study, in other words, outside the field of analytically accessible data. The boundaries of analytic accessibility are determined by two factors. First the analytic technique and experience brought to bear, and secondly the collusional or repressive patterns still operative within the analyst or the analytic school, in other words the common archetypal anxieties and the unconscious defences by which they are contained. Thus in terms of both construct and practice the boundaries of psychoanalysis present a collusional system defending society as a whole from interfacing the most primitive and terrifying levels of anxiety in the depth of everyman.

The shift in Joan Riviere's intention from that of describing genesis to illustrating application comes out in the following quotation,

Page 41

'From the very beginning of life, on Freud's own hypothesis, the psyche responds to the reality of its experiences by interpreting them - or rather, misinterpreting them -
in a subjective manner that increases its pleasure and preserves it from pain. This act of a subjective interpretation of experience, which it carries out by means of the processes of introjection and projection, is called by Freud hallucination; and it forms the foundation of what we mean by phantasy-life. The phantasy-life of the individual is thus the form in which his real internal and external sensations and perceptions are interpreted and represented to himself in his mind under the influence of the pleasure-pain principle. (It seems to me that one has only to consider for a moment to see that, in spite of all the advances man has made in adaptation of a kind to external reality, this primitive and elementary function of his psyche - to misinterpret his perceptions for his own satisfaction - still retains the upper hand in the minds of the great majority even of civilized adults). To begin with, however, reality is entirely misinterpreted; the perceptions are recognized but they are interpreted falsely.'

Again and again in the writing of Freudian analysts we find this phrase 'the very beginning of life' associated with the new-born infant suckling at the breast. Life apparently appears as if by magic at this comparatively fully formed phase. Any process prior to this position is taken as timeless and given, inaccessible, instinctual, genetically defined data, the irreducible basis of all future development.

The operation of the pleasure/pain principle is an example of the operation of a defence against the anxiety generated by pain. Experience which generates anxiety is repressed, denied and filtered out from the interpretation of the data being received. This pattern of behaviour is observed by Freud as being present 'from the very beginning of life', the boundary of psychical development which Freud places after birth. Joan Riviere makes some important comments on the significance of this defence against anxiety as a distorter of all subsequent data inputs, misperceptions of reality, etc., within the developed adult. Adult reality testing is seen as a partial recovery and control of this fundamental process. One is however left with the question as to why it is that 'in the beginning reality is entirely misinterpreted'. What is it about data from the environment which triggers anxiety and calls into operation such defences. I would suggest that such an innate position experienced immediately after birth represents the psychic response to the recent encounter with the possibility of annihilation, in which the environment as a whole became persecutory, and all ultimate belonging and security was lost. I suggest that life is a more or less adequate recovery from birth experience. The development of islands of consciousness engaged in reality testing in order to survive originates in the relation between infant and mother in the immediately post-parturition period, seen by Freud and his disciples as the beginning of life. The cut-off point of birth deprives Freudians, however, of dynamic insight into the process of recovery which the new-born infant is undergoing.

It is through these processes that the narcissistic impulse derives its omnipotence, maximising pleasure and minimising pain. There are conditions, however, in which the narcissistic drive is overwhelmed and to these Joan Riviere now turns.

Page 42

'There is the problem of the baby who will not suck; or there is the extreme instance of the ill baby, perhaps starved or neglected. The condition of such a child is usually one of pining, of depression; it clearly enjoys no satisfaction; moreover, as
we say, "it has no life in it". It is evidently much nearer to death than a lusty baby that screams. Now my suggestion is that such a child's ego is experiencing the reality of its condition, of its nearness to death and of its danger from the forces of the death instinct operating within it, and that it feels its helplessness against them. Its body has not sufficient life (Eros) to make possible a fusion strong enough to discharge the death instinct outwards in an aggressive act of screaming and by so doing to appeal for help. I suggest that such helplessness against destructive forces within constitutes the greatest psychical danger-situation known to the human organism, and that this helplessness is the deepest source of anxiety in human beings. This would correspond to the "traumatic situation" (Freud) and the "pre-ideational primal anxiety" (Jones).

To this Joan Riviere adds a footnote to the effect that,

Footnote Page 43

'We have reason to think, since Melanie Klein's latest work on depressive states, that all neuroses are different varieties of defence against this fundamental anxiety, each embodying mechanisms which become successively available to the organism as its development proceeds.'

Freud writing in 'Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety' Page 106 describes the danger experienced by the infant as 'a situation of accumulating tension against which it is helpless'.

Page 43

'[Freud] connects this danger with later castration- anxiety; and of this he also says "the ultimate form of this anxiety (and of that relating to the super-ego) appears to me to be the fear of death (anxiety in reference to life) In the infant, however, Freud denies an anxiety of death, even at birth. He says, "We certainly cannot presuppose anything approaching a kind of knowledge in the newborn child of the possibility of its life being extinguished". I am not suggesting that there is any such 'kind of knowledge' in the child, but I think there is reason to suppose that the child experiences feelings of the kind, just as any adult can feel like death, and in a state of great anxiety often does.'

It is as if the death instinct resides, like Leviathan, asleep within the depths but all too easily aroused into active persecutory activity by external stimuli of a deprivatory kind. Once aroused the death instinct generates a recurrence of the primal anxiety of annihilation. Thus in the face of external danger the anxieties generated stem from resonance with primal anxiety emanating from the death instinct rather than from reality- oriented anxiety associated with current environmental impingement. Reaction to subsequent environmental difficulty therefore is governed by the primitive methods of coping with death instinct anxiety. It is as if externally generated signals trigger off an internal signal generator which may or may not initiate appropriate reaction to the external stimulus concerned.

I would endorse Joan Riviere's thesis that the fundamental danger situation is not that associated with external environmental impingement in later life but is constituted by helplessness against overwhelming destructive forces within. This helplessness of the
reactor, suffering overwhelming impingement from the environment within primal trauma, is indeed 'the deepest source of anxiety in human beings'. I suggest, however, that the death instinct, which is seen as the persecutor generating anxiety, is itself the repressed trace of the persecuting environment from the primal trauma, rather than some genetically generated dichotomy within human psyche, a position which Freud and later Freudian analysts appear to assume.

Freud's connection of this overwhelming anxiety with later castration anxiety, the ultimate form of which he perceived as the fear of death, requires further comment. In so far as the total self is identified with the penis, just so far is castration perceived as annihilation of the self, or death. I would see therefore Freud's concentration on castration as the most acute form of anxiety as itself an internalisation and localisation of being within a part, a process which emerges at a fairly developed stage within the object relations of the infant. Fixation of this particular part identification within Freud may well have blocked his own analysis of the more primitive mechanisms at work. It is perhaps better to say that fear of death emerges as castration anxiety as one form of defence against the anxiety of total annihilation of the self.

The footnote indicating that all neuroses are different varieties of defence against this fundamental anxiety underlines once again the importance and significance of the origin of anxiety and the anxiety defences for subsequent human being and development. Statistically speaking, normal behaviour lies within the limits of the standard deviation from the mean occurrence and depth of such primal anxiety and the defences generated to contain it.

Joan Riviere moves next from consideration of constant sub-acute deprivation to infantile reaction to limited-duration, acute impingement.

Page 44

'The baby's typical response, say to acute hunger, is a reaction in which the whole body is involved: screaming, twitching, twisting, kicking, convulsive breathing, evacuations - all evident signs of overwhelming anxiety. Analytic evidence shows without any doubt that this reaction to the accumulated tension represents and is felt to be an aggressive discharge, as we should in any case imagine. If this reaction brings the required satisfaction, narcissistic phantasy can resume its sway. But if the desired breast is not forthcoming and the baby's aggression develops to the limit of its bodily capacities, this discharge, which automatically follows upon a painful sensation, itself produces unpleasure in the highest degree. The child is overwhelmed by choking and suffocating; its eyes are blinded with tears, its ears deafened, its throat sore; its bowels gripe, its evacuations burn it. The aggressive anxiety-reaction is far too strong a weapon in the hands of such a weak ego; it has become uncontrollable and is threatening to destroy its owner......

'Moreover, this furious discharge of aggression in the end reduces the child for the time being to the same condition of helpless exhaustion and lifelessness as results from a constant deprivation such as starving..... The end-result of aggression directed outward, if it cannot be checked and controlled, is again to produce the worst danger-situation possible, the closest proximity to death. So that, in my view, from the very
beginning the internal forces of the death instinct and of aggression are felt to be of a cardinal danger threatening the organism."

When the aggressive discharge is perceived to have an effect on the environment and change it then the aggression is experienced as an appropriate way of dealing with the anxiety, i.e. the aggression changes behaviour of the environment, so overcoming the source of the anxiety, perceived in this instance to be external. If, on the other hand, however intense the aggression becomes, no environmental change is perceived, then the infant is subjected to impingement within which it is impotent to change the persecuting environment, and at this point two processes take over control. Firstly, the aggressive outburst itself becomes even more persecutory of the infant organism than the environment was, so generating a feedback loop within the anxiety-provoking situation, and at this point change in the environment would not alleviate the anxiety generated by the infant's own aggression. Secondly, primal response to impinging environment is re-evoked and overlays the subsidiary or secondary trauma with more primitive material. The precipitating experience of loss therefore becomes identified with the primal experience of threatened annihilation. This helps to elucidate why it is that 'the end result of aggression directed outward...... is again to produce the worst danger situation possible, the closest proximity to death'.

The importance and significance of the material for later development is again underlined,

"In spite of all later complications and even reversals, I believe anxiety of helplessness in the face of destructive forces within (a severe depletion of Eros within the organism) constitutes the fundamental pattern of all subsequent anxieties. Further, all later psychical developments are built up on this foundation and can be found to contain this situation at their core; i.e. they are not merely adaptations to be external world and to the changing needs of the organism but at the same time constitute the measures of protection against this primordial danger-situation which is ever present to the ego in the depths."

So reaction to any external stimuli is made up of two components, the reality-oriented response to data received across boundary which generates certain appropriate anxieties, together with the reverberated or reactivated anxieties stored in internal core. It is the defences brought into play to handle these internal anxiety resonances which determine the eventual reaction to the triggering external stimulus. It is in this mechanism that we see the source of reality distortion within normal adult behaviour. It constitutes a limitation on human development while still employing the so-called normal anxiety defences. Modification of these normal defences, however, requires access to the precipitating trauma of the persecutory environment experienced in the second stage of labour. This analytic therapeutic processes is violently suppressed because of the fundamental terrors and primitive aggression which it evokes.

In the rest of her paper Joan Riviere moves on to the application of these fundamental anxiety defences within the field of developing object relations and the processes of introjection/projection by which they are constituted.
CHAPTER FOUR ‘CERTAIN FUNCTIONS OF INTROJECTION AND PROJECTION IN EARLY INFANCY’ BY PAULA HEIMANN
PAGES 122 - 168

The paper opens with a study of the relationship between the id, the ego and the super-ego, with the ego perceived as that which mans the boundary between the id and the environment, and the super-ego that which exercises judgement on the way the ego performs its task. I now find this 3-fold division unhelpful and would want to work with the concept of the whole being engaging different levels, stages and functions in defence against anxiety and in orientation to reality. The classical Freudian trichotomy, however, helps to tease apart and highlight some of these functions. Thus,

Page 124

'As the surface part of the id, the ego is directed by the instincts, the needs of the id, and the complex process of perception serves the purpose of mediating between the id and the outer world. It is essential that the ego should admit entry only to those stimuli which are suitable and bar off those which are dangerous. In both parts of perception introjection and projection are operative. When the ego receives stimuli from outside, it absorbs them and makes them part of itself, it introjects them. When it bars them off, it projects them, because the decision of their harmfulness is subsequent to a trial introjection. Selection, discrimination, etc., are based on introjection and projection.

The selective net generated by the complex process of introjection and projection is itself fabricated from the more primitive level of the id or instinctual drives, basic to which are the twin but opposed life and death instincts. In so far as the anxieties generated by the death instinct are projected outwards onto the environment, just so far is the introjection of the environment managed by the id seen as harmful, so that the subjective experience of environmental stimuli is itself a mapping of projection from previously introjected experience. I would postulate that the instinctual drives of the id represent the introjected natal and pre-natal experience of the foetus undergirded by the purely genetic foundation.

Once we come to understand the death instinct as a composite defence against the anxiety generated during the intra-uterine and birth experience of the foetus then the otherwise baseless comment of Paula Heimann, 'It is essential that the ego should admit entry only to those stimuli which are suitable and bar off those which are dangerous' begins to make sense. All stimuli which might re-evoke the intra-uterine and parturitional trauma must be suppressed, a process which is well enough understood in relation to all subsequent traumatic experience.

Further light is thrown on this by the following,

Page 125

'It is not only in expelling an unsuitable external stimulus, which proved a mistake, as it were, to take in, that the ego uses projection. When it discharges inner tensions, it projects something of its own. Thus projection relates to what was
originally part of the self as well as to what was originally part of the outer world. Moreover, whilst the projection of what is bad and useless is more striking and was discovered early in psycho-analytic work, more recent observations have shown that the ego also projects what is good and useful. In fact it might be said that this notion is implied in Freud's statement that it projects - "thrusts forth whatever within itself gives rise to pain" - because the inner tensions felt as pain must be traced ultimately to the co-existence of the two opposite instincts of life and death, the impulses for self-preservation and pleasure and the dangerous destructive impulses."

Projection always relates to that which was internal or part of the self prior to the projection. In other words, what comes out must have gone in, even if as in the previous section the projection is perceived virtually as a bounce of external stimuli. Now the statement that projection relates to what was 'originally' part of the self depends on where the origin is placed. In classical Freudian and Kleinian analysis introjection is seen to start with the nipple, the origin lies immediately prior to the first feed but post-parturition, that which is initially projected onto the bad comes from that which was originally part of the self; or as we would now understand it, that which had been previously introjected from the persecutory and supportive experience of intra-uterine and parturitional stimuli. It seems clear that one can only sustain such preconceptions about introjection and projection if the origin is taken as afterbirth. If, however, the starting point of life is taken as conception there can be no such 'pre-conceptions'. It is essential to adjust the origin of psychic and physical life to coincide in time if a unified field theory of human behaviour is to be devised with a coherent construct.

If we take the origin at conception then introjection is primary. Projection, however instantaneous and immediate, is secondary, i.e. responsive to environmental stimulus.

Paula Heimann goes on to draw attention to an important feedback process within introjection and projection as follows,

"Introjection does not exclusively relate to what is part of the outer world, because introjection can be secondary to projection. An object can become good and desirable precisely in consequence of an earlier projection of what was good, and when in its further contact with such an object the ego introjects from it, it receives back what was in part originally its own, it "re-introjects". Introjection and projection interact in various ways."

I suggest that it is the iterative loop of introjection/projection that underlies the splitting of external environment or external objects into good and bad. The parallel behaviour of signal pick-up by a microphone linked to amplifier and loudspeaker affords a powerful illustration. If sustained in a totally silent environment the volume control can be turned up until the unit is hypersensitive. In this condition, any signal from the environment is picked up by the microphone (introjected) almost instantaneously amplified and broadcast by the loudspeaker (projected) and picked up again by the microphone (re-introjected). Re-introjection or feedback becomes a loop process, independent of the initiating external stimulus, but generating a perceived environment (as received by the microphone) which is itself generated by the system (projected through the loudspeaker)."
The fundamental splitting of environmental reality into the omnipotent, omniscient, all good God with its concomitant antithesis, together with the reflection of such splitting into the self, may well be seen to be the matrix of theology (construct) and religion (process).

Confirmation that Paula Heimann sees the beginning of projection in association with the breast is afforded by the quotation,

Page 127

'The perception of the outer world, with all the activities implied in perception, can be traced to the infant's first contacts with another human being and within these to his experiences at his mother's breast. This is his most important external source of sensations, of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, pleasure or pain. The first perception of importance must be essentially the sensations of receiving by mouth, sucking, swallowing, spewing.'

The denial of life before birth appears to be as psychotic as the projection of life after death and maintained for similar reasons.

Although for Paula Heimann, ego formation takes place in the process of projection/introjection as the infant begins to relate with its environment afterbirth, she shows acute awareness that id, ego and super-ego cannot really be divided.

Page 137

'When we analyse actual instances of introjection, we come to see that ego and super-ego formation can be closely linked with each other; we shall be warned against a too rigid demarcation between the two. At this point we are again in agreement with Freud's view that the three systems, whilst they enjoy a certain amount of individuality and independence, are not autarchic, and can still fuse with one another. Though differentiated, the mind is one. Ego and super-ego are yet parts of the id.'

For Freud the id was the original mind which interacted with its environment, and in that process developed the ego and super-ego functions or parts. If the origin is taken at the beginning of the Oedipal phase then the id is the mind which is present at that point, its content is assumed to be innate, instinctual or even 'genetic'.

In the Kleinian position the id is the presenting mind after birth with its instinctual, innate or genetic drives implanted, which determine its relation to the environment and its reaction - projection/introjection, splitting, denial/idealisation, and subsequently evolved mechanisms which emerge during the process of interaction. Thus id is seen as, by definition, the characteristic of the psyche at the origin of life wherever that origin is placed. Ego and super-ego functions represent development of that psyche between the origin and a subsequent point in time. Id, ego and super-ego are therefore functions determined by the selection of origin. If the origin is taken at the end of BPM I, that is at full term but prior to any labour, then the id is the psyche as formed at the end of the intra-uterine phase, and ego and super-ego functions can be traced as originating on the onset of the birth process. If the origin is taken at conception then the 'id' represents that psychical character which is
transmitted genetically through the parental material in the fertilised ovum. Ego and super-ego developments emerge through the developments of introjection/projection, splitting, denial/idealisation operative during the intra-uterine and birth experience followed by all subsequent life trace.

This raises fundamental questions about the pre-conception formation of the id. Is the DNA molecule programmable? What levels of information (built up by introjection/projection mechanisms etc.) can be stored in a single cell? Could Pavlov's experiments be repeated at a microscopic scale with amoebae? Is evolution controlled by cellular learning processes in response to environmental introjection rather than by random quirks in DNA structure?

Ultimately, this quest raises the issues of molecular and atomic programming and unifies the material and conscious parts of being into a unified field just as the matter/energy equation unified the physical field. Teilhard de Chardin's intuitive construct begins to be seen in a new light as we examine the unification of all fields from cosmology and fundamental particle physics, through bio-chemistry and DNA investigation, through genetic engineering to evolutionary studies, to foetal development patterns, to psychoanalysis, to human development, to interpersonal and societal dynamics and global construct modelling. The energy/matter/consciousness field is one.

The concept of the id in psychoanalysis is equivalent to the concept of God in religious systems, i.e. the id contains that which originated beyond the boundaries of the known. The existence of the id is then reified, and contains and fixates that boundary. It is therefore a defence against the anxiety of the fluid boundary and a constraint on the penetration of new fields of knowledge. The equivalent point in the physical sciences is represented by cosmogony, or the beginning of the universe, with the different theories or myths associated with the presented content and the assumed origin. If the origin of the known universe is taken as after the explosion of the black hole, then the existence of energy/matter/consciousness prior to that point is to all intents and purposes denied, and is subject to mythology. God, the singularity, the id are parallel concepts handling in different forms the boundaries of the knowable, but effectively bounding the knowable and acting as a mirror back into the 'ring of bright water' of all attempts at further exploration. Penetration to the behaviour of matter/energy/consciousness within the black hole, examination of the content and formation of the id prior to birth, therefore inevitably affect the understanding of the content of God. In other words, they modify the mythological construct used to handle existential boundaries.

As so often happens in the examination of the boundaries of a construct being employed by an analyst, the wording used to describe boundary conditions contains within it trans-boundary unconscious projection. So as Paula Heimann seeks to describe the initial object relations characteristics we find symbolism from the intra-uterine phase pressing through into the post-partem object relations development:

Page 143

'Infantile object-relations are fluid and oscillate between extremes. There is a tendency to massive reactions. Feelings are all good or all bad, and so is the object for the infant. Intermediate tones are absent. What in fact is only an aspect of the object is treated as all of it at the given time, and the aspect selected corresponds
with the infant's predominant urge. The object is treated as both inside, "me", and outside, "not me", yet if outside as concerning the self and depending on it. But in the same way in which unconscious phantasy is in general the forerunner of logical thinking, so this arbitrary, phantastic relation to objects is the basis for realistic and mature object-relations; it is one type of object-relationship.

This description of primitive object relations appears to fit the intra-uterine phase in which the body boundary interrelates with its environment through a fluid medium, the primal object is in fact the primal environment or context. Just as there is no differentiation of parts in the environment so there is no differentiation of parts in the self, and the fundamental distinction is between the 'not me' and the 'me', between the self and its environment, between the intra and extra skin boundary. In this case projection/introjection is a massive oscillation of content between the in and out sets. In Kleinian terms, I would submit that this intra-uterine position is instinctive, innate or genetic and forms the foundation for all object relations post-partem.

The beginning of afterbirth offers the developing psyche no longer environments as wholes, but objects within that environment as parts. The object relations therefore develop within the overall context of the environment relations, both employing the same mechanisms which have been used to manage the boundary between the self and the environment. These mechanisms now manage the relationship between that part of the self which relates to the part of environment or object experienced. Thus,

'The capacity to differentiate, which tends to mitigate the intensity of emotional reactions and which is an important step towards clearer thinking, develops on this primitive foundation, which for a long time remains dominant. I am inclined to see one reason for the universal phenomenon of infantile amnesia in the fact that early infantile feeling-thinking is so confused and that the light of consciousness is maintained only for moments parts of the developing ego sink back into the id.'

This is another way of saying that the environmental relations laid down in the intra-uterine and parturitional experiences are primary and that subsequent object or part relationships develop gradually through the complex learning process of the engagement of the infant with its environment in afterbirth. This is a learning process which involves adaptation of previous response traces rather than the laying down of archetypal responses on a tabula rasa. The id represents this original or instinctive matrix onto which future experience is mapped. The id, or instinctive-at-birth, psyche is characterised therefore by the self/environment relations developed intrauterine and disrupted by the experience of birth itself. The intra-uterine and parturitional traumata or experiences of sub-traumatic stress generate the unconscious repressions and defences against anxiety which are brought to bear as the id upon post partem object relations. The analysis of severe depressive states is traced by Paula Heimann to the oral phase of development which can now be perceived as made of two major elements, that is the instinctive id or intra-uterine and parturitional environment relationships, together with the object relations developed through oral experience of the breast. Hardly surprisingly Paula Heimann's description of depressive material combines these two elements.
'When we analyse states of severe depression (which, as we know, involves regression to the oral phase of development), we can see how the phantasies about the introjected object yet comprise an element of the "me", and how fluid the feelings are about what is "me" and what is the object. The analysis of such states gives indeed a very impressive picture of oscillations between the self and objects, internal and external. We have to recognize a dual nature in these early object-relations: the object is both perceived and ignored, accepted and denied. This dual process occurs either simultaneously or in such rapid sequence as to be practically simultaneous. (The very obscure problem of time-concepts in early life cannot be entered into here). This dualism can also be described in terms of limitations set by physiological and by psychological factors: in part the infant does not yet recognize objects because his capacity for perception develops only gradually, but partly from psychological motives he denies, by means of omnipotence and magic, what he has perceived.'

There is here a conflation of the intra-uterine, the perinatal and the oral phases of development, with object relationships overlaid on environment relationships, with oral contact under-girded by fluid boundaries, with the introjection/projection associated with object relationships, founded on the oscillation between inside and outside of the foetus in uterine environment.

The comments on time, of course, are highly significant since I take it there is an intensification of time and sequence of events in the world of afterbirth that is of a different order to the periodic variations experienced intra-uterine. Under hyper-stress intra-uterine perceptions of time may come back into play - concepts of time standing still in emergencies, traumata etc.

The physiological and psychological limitation within the dualism is distorted by the inappropriate origin. The capacity for the perception of objects as distinct parts within the environment develops gradually, but whether this is a physiological or a psychological limitation in the speed of perceptual development is unclear. If the new-born infant is seen as a tabula rasa then the slowness must be attributed to physiological developmental factors. If, however, intra-uterine and parturitional material is allowed and the origin is shifted from post-partem to conception, then the slowness of development of object relations can be attributed to difficulties in the learning process generated by the repression of environmental stimuli and the dominance of projection of the bad environment stimulated by the birth trauma. In this case the new-born babe is highly insensitive to environmental signals, and environmental data is generated by re-introjection of the projected persecuting womb. If this feedback loop generates too much noise the infant is likely to reject the breast and appear totally cut off and split from its environment with consequent feeding difficulties and relational inhibitions. Conversely, the 'normal' pattern of object relations is not a de nova development but represents a recovery from the psychotic position induced by parturition.

In her next section Paula Heimann moves to consider the processes of auto-eroticism, narcissism, and the early relation to objects. She points out that in auto-erotic activity the infant turns to the internalised good breast, and organ pleasure is connected with pleasure derived from an imagined object. Such a process is possible because of the incorporation phantasies operating by which the perceived object is felt to be within the body boundary.
'In hallucinatory gratification the infant utilizes his incorporation phantasies. Since he possesses the good breast within himself, he has it as his beck and call, can omnipotently manipulate it, and deny the actual condition of frustration and pain. The inner 'good' object has such strong psychic reality that for the time being the need for the feeding breast can be stifled, overpowered, successfully denied and projected outside, whilst the sucked part of his body is identified with the introjected breast, the desired object. Introjection and projection account for the infant's independence in his auto-eroticism.'

As we begin to see environmental relations as preceding object relations, it becomes clear that intra-uterine incorporation occurs not simply within the oral cavity but is a trans-skin boundary process by which the environment is internalised and possessed. Thus the good supportive environment, the benevolent cosmos, the God in whom we move and live and have our being is actually internalised as the Ground of Being, the core around which the foetal self exists. Thus the condition which was experienced as adequate dependency in a good supportive environment re-emerges by hallucinatory gratification in terms of dependency on the internalised good environment, and in this oscillation process between the internalised (introjected) and externalised (projected) good environment, lies the root of much religious activity. Provided the phantasies and oscillation process can be sufficiently well maintained, the persecutory elements of the environment can be denied whether in the internalised or externalised position. It is, I suggest, the sustaining of this primitive anxiety defence which underlies Bruce Reed's definition of functional religion. The myth and ritual (movement and process) of the religious system may then be viewed as a corporate process of hallucination, utilising primal environment relations as a defence against the ultimate anxiety of being in cosmos.

'A person who is hallucinating has regressed to the primitive mode of perception which involves introjection, and by using several primitive mechanisms (magic, omnipotence, and denial he conjures up the image of his internalized object and projects it into the outside world. In his conscious conviction the object then exists in tangible reality, and this conviction may serve as a defence against frustration. What is hallucinated may be a visual image, or it may be auditory, or a bodily sensation, according to which elements of the relation with the internal object predominate at the time. The value of this defence against frustration varies; an hallucination may be the gratifying Fata Morgana of a loved and lost person or a dreaded persecutor. (There is some gain even in the latter case, since it is easier to defend oneself against an external enemy than an internal one.)'

So the gods are created by projective reification from the internalised objects and environments of primal being. The subjective experiences associated with the process are those referred to as 'religious experience', and the more deeply the person's boundary is under stress (life crises, threats to personal identity, imminent danger etc.) the more intensely this process of hallucinatory gratification is engaged as a defence against the otherwise overwhelming terrors of potential destruction. Such anxieties stem in part from the reality of
the environment in which the person is placed, but particularly from the re-introjection of the projected and denied persecutory environment, the unconscious shadow of god.

Page 148

'When we take into account the infant's oscillation between his internal and external object (breast), we can no longer regard auto-eroticism as a definite 'phase of development' which extends over a certain period. We regard auto-erotic activities rather as a mode of behaviour, coincident with allo-erotic activities..... The oscillation between auto-erotic behaviour and object-erotic experiences constitutes one of those interacting processes which characterize early emotional life.'

In so far as Melanie Klein perceives object relations as foundational for psychic development, just so far is she bound to place the origin of such development after birth. For her, as for W.R. Bion, life begins at the breast. However, once the frontiers of psychoanalysis are put back through the birth experience and deep into the period of intra-uterine development, the same processes which arise in relationship to part-objects after birth are seen to be operative in relationship to whole environments in the primal condition. Thus the mechanisms of introjection, projection, (and oscillation), splitting, idealisation and denial, emerge first in the world of environmental relations and only in after birth focus into part-object relations. The loss of the enveloping, tactile environment occasioned by birth is only partially, and very inadequately, compensated for by the holding environment of after birth. This loss is compensated for by the projection onto the environment of the internalised good womb - this life-sustaining context, always sought, never found, to re-enter which is heaven, whose existence is projected to the boundary of the cosmos, yet found also in the depth of being. Worship then acquires significance, within the oscillation process, as that activity within which the internalised phantasy good environment is externalised, projected, reified, and the worshipper in foetal trance experiences once again the security of being held and affirmed by the accepting omnipotent source of life. Worship then, as a process, strengthens the denial of the painfully persecuting elements of the environment, and in the re-introjecting phase, the transition from extra- to intra-dependence, purges the internal world of its persecutory objects again by the process of denial and projection. The good external environment is perceived as carrying away, bearing on our behalf, the bad internal objects and environment and their effects. Thus cleansed and renewed, (i.e. strengthened in his primal paranoid-schizoid defences) the worshipper returns to the real world with strengthened phantasies, lowered anxiety, greater peace of mind, diminished responsibility, and dysfunctional boundary transactions.

It is the dominance of this dysfunctional phantasy within Christianity which renders that religion dangerously dysfunctional during the current phase of human history. As we now face the racial engagement with the boundaries of growth, the constriction of space, the inadequacy of food and energy supplies, the pollution and potential environmental persecution flowing from industrial and military processes, the religious position seeks to deny, repress and filter out all data which give warning of environmental stress. Such a process increases societal sedation, lowers social anxiety, and helps with the management of social process, but in so doing destroys the creative and authentic response of mankind to the crisis. The religious drive diverts energy from problem solving to anxiety relieving. It enables man to face the future with peace of mind at the cost of the castration of man's creative ability to manage the problems of relating in reality to his environment. Such a
position propels mankind toward the very racial catastrophe in fear of which he seeks religious assurance.

Turning her attention briefly to paranoid positions, Paula Heimann writes,

Page 153

'I wish to refer very briefly to another pathological condition in adult life, in which the patient uses the mechanisms of splitting in order to secure his belief that he himself is good, whilst the other person is bad. The delusional aspects of paranoid conditions show clearly the role played by denial. As is well known, delusional jealousy and fear of persecution are based on denial and projection. It appears that in these conditions it is above all the sense of guilt which the patient cannot tolerate and against which he sets going the defences of denial, splitting and projecting..... I wish to stress the observation that a person's intolerance of the sense of guilt is essentially his intolerance of admitting, even to himself, that there is something bad in himself, i.e. that something of him is bad, which he cannot disown by treating it as a foreign object inside himself. The result of the technique of delusional projection is two-fold: fear of persecution by the person who is chosen for such projection and a conviction of the goodness of what is felt to be the self. It might be said that the individual pays the penalty of persecution for self-complacency.

The experience of the bad environment, the persecutory aspects of intra-uterine experience, are internalised as the bad self (as distinct from the internalised persecutory object associated with a part of the self within the Kleinian object-relations construct). In so far as the splitting and denial mechanisms are inadequate to suppress awareness of the bad self, the anxiety and guilt generated is dealt with by splitting and projection, leading to the phantasy of a persecutory environment, a force of evil in the world and so forth. This generates the black, evil mirror, the powers of darkness, the antithesis of the good god. The drama of Rama is a notable working out of the battle between these two projected parts. The theology of atonement likewise offers a way of dealing with these intolerable inconsistencies in being. Scapegoating is a mild form of such paranoid projection, focused in religious observance into sacrificial ritual and culminating in penal substitutionary atonement. The internalised persecutory environment, identified as bad self, is projected onto the chosen victim who is deemed to carry the sin of the world, vicariously, so enabling the worshipper, now delivered from the presence and power of internalised evil., to relate unhindered with Him who is of 'purer eyes than to behold evil'. Justification by faith and penal substitution therefore represent a validation of primal splitting and paranoid projection as a way of handling anxiety generated initially in reaction to the perceived persecutory environment of the intra-uterine and perinatal phase of being.

This process is of course much more effective as a defence against anxiety than paranoid projection, since in the latter the persecutory self still walks the world and the subject lives in fear. In Christian tradition, however, the persecutor has died and risen, no longer returning in retaliation, but subsumed in love. The death instinct has no more dominion. So the Christian religion offers peace with god. The price that is paid, however, is the maintenance of psychotic defences against anxiety as normative in Western society.
The energy vested in phantasy object-relations and hence the usefulness of the mechanism as a defence against anxiety is subject to certain developmental changes.

'The phantasy-object to which the infant is at any time related differs in accordance with the stages in his ego-development. In the earlier phase, characterized by simple wish-fulfilling auto-erotic activities, the object is virtually a 'part-object', whilst in later phases, when narcissistic states play a greater role, objects are already recognized as persons ('whole object' stage). In this connection we have to consider an economic factor. It seems plausible to assume that hallucinatory gratification can occur more easily when its object is a part, i.e. the nipple, than when it is a person; for the memory which underlies hallucination, if it concerns the nipple, is bound up with the full sensation of the mouth/nipple contact: the nipple really was 'inside' the infant, enclosed by his lips, gums and tongue. It may well be that in the earlier phase, the part-object relation, a greater quantity of libido is concentrated on the object than in the later phase, whereas sensations and emotions may occur in a less concentrated form if the object is felt as a person.'

Thus in defence against anxiety, regression to fairly primitive person relations constitutes a first level. If the anxieties increase, regression will move back to part-object relationships. I suggest, therefore, that the environmental relationships which characterise primal experience provide a further backstop of anxiety defence. I would go further to postulate that such anxiety defences are normative in relationship to the fundamental anxieties of being. There may well be an even deeper level of defence associated with the oceanic or undifferentiated foetal position, in which the subject deals with threatening anxiety experienced across boundaries by regressing to the point at which all boundaries are denied, as the drop returns to the ocean and the goal of Nirvana is achieved. The successive stages of anxiety defence in social behaviour can be seen in terms of basic assumption activity, paranoid-schizoid defences against anxiety, religious behaviour, with its various levels culminating in detached trance or ecstatic union with the One. Significantly, the Christian tradition starkly affirms the existence of boundary between person and God and the inter-relationship across the boundary, even though some of her mystics have pressed back in the regressive phase to the point at which even those boundaries become blurred. The link between Eastern mysticism and the Christian tradition becomes more explicit at this level.

The defences against anxiety employed become successively more dysfunctional in enabling reality-oriented boundary transactions, as they become successively effective in suppressing the anxieties concerned. Herein lies their seduction and the strength of the collusional systems which surround religious institutions.

We can now offer a tentative definition of the task of religious institutions in society as validating the normative societal anxiety defence system and sustaining it by myth and ritual, movement and process, to challenge which is taboo.

Paula Heimann's next section is entitled 'Inner World and Outer World'. She begins by tracing all psychic development back to its roots in introjection.
'Introjection sets processes going which involve all spheres of psychic life and often, too, have a not inconsiderable influence on physical life. Less, perhaps, than any other developmental mechanism is it an event which is over and done with, once it has taken place. An inner world comes into being. The infant feels that there are objects, parts of people and people, inside his body, that they are alive and active, affect him and are affected by him. This inner world of life and events is a creation of the infant's unconscious phantasy, his private replica of the world and objects around him. Thus it forms part of his relation to his environment, and he is no less affected by the condition and activities and feelings - imagined by himself, though they are - of his self-created inner objects than by the real people outside himself. Sensations, feelings, moods and modes of behaviour are largely determined by such phantasies about people inside the body and events in the inner world. These events reflect the outer world in a phantastically elaborated and distorted way, yet at the same time they can make the outer world appear as only a reflection of themselves. All the feelings the infant is capable of he experiences also in relation to his inner objects, and all his mental functions, emotional and intellectual, his relations with people and things, are decisively influenced by this system of phantasies. He may feel protected or persecuted, elated or depressed, by his internal objects, or he may feel himself their benefactor or their persecutor.'

Introjection is primary. We have nothing that we have not received. Introjection initiates the differentiation between the internal and external worlds, between that which is self and that which is not self, between being and environment. Indeed the skin boundary can be thought of in terms of a mirror. Information received across this boundary generates an analogue, a model, a mirror-image, convoluted and distorted though it may be, of the world beyond. Boundary conditions of the self and boundary conditions of the environment are thus intimately related. Thus the self, the internalised environment, is populated by objects, parts of people and people, but the primary introjected entity is the environment, not the nipple. It is against the backdrop of that internalised environment, split, denied, idealised, projected, though it may be, that all other objects and all subsequent data take their place. If, as in the Kleinian construct, the boundary of life is drawn at the breast, then the processes analysed, experienced, described within Kleinian analysis can be likened to the activities going on within the boundaries of a ship, while ignoring the general movement of the ship within the sea. Environmentally generated disturbances produce effects within the Kleinian construct but their source is beyond the horizon of examination. The phenomena are taken as part of the given, the instinctual, the innate, the genetically determined characteristic of personality. The effects of environmental disturbance cannot be accounted for causally, and as is the case with most uncaused causes they are defined by tautology, as if the words 'instinct' or 'innate' can answer all questions. Since environmentally generated phenomena are beyond the realm of causal analysis, such disturbances also lie beyond the realm of effective intervention or therapeutic analysis. Thus it is within Kleinian systems that the so-called paranoid-schizoid defences against anxiety (i.e. those generated in response to the primal environment) are seen as those of all conditions least amenable to insight, least responsive to therapeutic intervention and most resistant to remission.

As the infant matures, his phantasies about the internal objects also change.
The process can be described in terms of unification, consistency and stability; gradually the 'internal objects' assume an abstract character. Phantasies about living entities within the self develop into ideas and mental work with concepts, a process which begins in quite young children. At the height of maturity this system of phantasies is resolved in the formation of an integrated ego and a uniform super-ego. That this, however, is achieved only in varying degrees, and may be again disrupted under conditions of strain, with the result that the primitive phantasies reappear, is a daily observation for the analyst.'

So Paula Heimann outlines the process of development from the most primitive levels of introjection, and the formation of internal objects and phantasies, through the settling down of such a world and its stabilising - the shift from internal objects to mental images and ideas, the processing of such ideas into concepts and schemata, and the formation of such schemata into a world view. In so far as the internalised world is an accurate, or reality oriented, mirror, or 'map', of the environment, just so is the person equipped and adapted for engagement with the reality of the world around. In so far as the internalised world is at variance with the reality of the environment in the here and now, just so does the person exhibit mismatch between reality and perception, between stimulus and reaction. If, in particular, the internalised world is too rigidly fixed, then change in the environment fails to generate a matching change in the internalised world, in which case, the rapidly changing environment leads to deterioration in the functional interaction between person and surroundings. Reaction to change, therefore, highlights the anxiety defences and their strengths, and tests their capacity for modification.

In this system there is a potentially destructive negative feedback loop, in that the more rapidly changing, stressful and anxiety-creating the environment becomes, the more heavily entrenched the anxiety defences have to be to handle the anxiety, and the less amenable to change does the internalised system become. This would seem to be the process underlying 'future shock' or psychotic collapse under too rapid change. When the anxiety generated, rather than the primary data itself, becomes the agenda with which the person tries to deal, dysfunctionality becomes proportional to stress, and breakdown, whether individual or social, threatens.

This feedback loop within anxiety defence systems is illustrated by Paula Heimann's comments on disturbance of the processes of introjection and projection.

The favourable pattern, where the feelings about a persecuting inner breast stimulate the wish to expel it and take in a good breast, promotes the infant's contact with the outer world. But it does not always prevail. There are conditions in which the infant feels that his body is filled with bad objects, too powerful for him to do anything about them, and this may inhibit the mechanism of projection and subsequently interfere with introjection. (In so far as the inhibition of projection represents a failure to turn aggression outwards in self-defence, it would ultimately suggest a failure of the life instinct in its fight against the death instinct within.) Again, the fear that everything within is bad and dangerous may lead to the despair
that there is nowhere anything good, or that, although there may still be something good outside, it cannot be taken in, as it would only turn bad through contact with the powerful bad objects and forces within. Phantasies of this kind create a vicious circle; the inner situation gets worse, because it cannot be relieved by introjecting a good object, but the worse it gets, the more introjection becomes inhibited. It is a state of mounting anxiety and distress.'

It is highly significant that at the heart of this section, and holding the boundary between primal and post-natal phenomena, lies Paula Heimann's appeal to conflict between life instinct and death instinct as an explanation of the disturbance. The vicious circle, or negative feedback loop, is seen as set up by an overwhelming of the life instinct by the death instinct. Once the primal field is also allowed for examination, further avenues of causal explanation are called for. Within this construct the vicious circle may be traced in its origin to hyper-stress in the intra-uterine, or perinatal phase, leading to the introjection of a powerful, persecutory environment. This can overwhelm the experience of good or supportive environment, leading to a reversal of the normal pattern of idealised good, denied bad, into idealised bad, denied good, environmental relations. Thus the internal world is perceived as bad, and exists in a persecutory or bad environment, each feeding the other, with no way of re-engaging the good, life-giving environment. The result of this position is one of fixation, or blockage, in which any development can only make things worse (the only allowable introjection is that of bad environment, bad part-objects, bad objects, bad persons, which only makes matters worse). Developmental paralysis is the ultimate defence against further collapse.

Pressing beyond the most primitive phases of part-object relations, Paula Heimann concludes her article with an examination of the functions of introjection and projection, first in reference to whole objects, and then in reference to persons at the onset of the Oedipal phase.

'In the earlier phase, owing to the inefficiency of his intellectual powers and the use of primitive defences like magic, denial, omnipotence and splitting, the infant conceives of his objects (or part-objects) in a simple and uniform way: when he feels gratified, his object is good and loved, when he is frustrated, the same object is bad and hated; he does not realize that he treats two aspects of one and the same object as if they were two different and unconnected objects. Whenever, as a result of development, this technique of 'not-associating' or splitting is not available, the infant is exposed to the conflict of ambivalence, of simultaneous love and hate, attraction and rejection towards the same object, and this conflict leads to certain anxiety-situations.'

Objectively, this position is characterised by more or less acute ambivalence, subjectively, the conflicted emotions of love and rage lead to the condition of more or less intense depression. Re-integration of areas of the personality in which splitting has been sustained, is characterised by periods of acute ambivalence and depression, as the previously dissociated parts are brought together into a whole, toward which the conflicted emotions are experienced consciously at one and the same time, rather than split, associated with separated parts of the original object, and held as alternatives by idealisation and denial.
Splitting mechanisms are most dominant in the most primitive phases of development. They are supremely active in the intra-uterine phase, and fixated in the birth process.

Page 161

'When the splitting mechanisms diminish, the dangerous qualities of the oral activities are felt along with the desires dictated by love. Thus the fear arises of destroying the loved mother in the very act of expressing love for her, and the fear of losing her in the very process designed to secure her possession. These anxieties are multiplied by the dual aspects of the loved object, again the result of the greater coherence and integration of the ego, since the loved and gratifying mother is now also the dangerous frustrating person. To yield to the desire to incorporate the good object is fraught with the danger of taking in its badness, and conversely expulsion of the bad inner object threatens the loss of its goodness.'

If such mechanisms are applied across the boundary of parturition, we can perceive the origin of acute ambivalence about the primal environment. To re-enter the primal environment in its good aspect is fraught with the terror of encountering once again the cosmic persecution of the bad primal environment. The concept of dread underlies the approach to the Holy which is both feared and desired, perceived as accepting and yet also as destructive, and split therefore into Heaven and Hell. Conversely the exorcism of the bad self (introjected bad environment) carries with it angst concerning the destruction of the good self. Object relations can develop from primitive to more mature through the repetitive experience of incorporation and loss, of presence and withdrawal, of both objects and persons. The primal environment, however, is lost once and for all in birth, and in that fundamental nexus of loss is the fixation point which locks the development of environmental relations in the primitive paranoid-schizoid position. It is this common point of fixation, at a point at which people share the greatest proportion of common experience, which gives rise to the phantasies, symbolism, projection, reification, mythologising and ritual enactment of religious systems. It also underlies the formation of those symbol constructs described by Carl Jung as 'Archetypes of the Racial Unconscious'. Far from being ancestral, we would now perceive such common symbols as constructs of the racially common primal process.

Page 162

'It is in general true that a mental process which allays conflicts and anxieties of a certain kind rouses others, so that only a relative freedom from anxiety, a relative peace of mind, is achieved. Such is mental life; there is no standstill for any length of time, especially during the period of growth and development. Serenity, the prerogative of the old and wise, often goes together with a halt in progression.'

Serenity, peace of mind, is not only the prerogative of the old and wise, it is the goal of religion. So it is that the religious process is employed as a defence against the pain of maturation. Overtly it names its goal the presentation of every man mature; dynamically it perpetuates in process the fixation of primal splitting, idealisation and denial, in a vain attempt to sustain both personal and societal defences against the anxiety of being-in-cosmos.

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